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6 August 2013 
 
Piercing Me Softly: Achieving Justice without ostensibly 
Piercing the Corporate Veil after Prest v Petrodel Resources 
Ltd 
(Piercing the Corporate Veil after Prest v Petrodel Resources 
Ltd: A Remedy of Last Resort) Munby J. in Ben Hashem 
approved para 103 
 
 
On 12 June 2013, the UK Supreme Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 That the authorities show that the separate legal personality of the company could 
not be disregarded unless it was being abused for a purpose that was in some 
relevant respect improper, para. 6. 
 The 3 possible legal bases on which the assets of Petrodel might be available to 
satisfy the lump sum order against the husband, para. 9.  
 Property legally vested in a company may belong beneficially to the controller, if 
the arrangements in relation to the property are such as to make the company its 
controller’s nominee or trustee for that purpose, para 16.   
 Most cases in which the corporate veil was pierced could have been decided on 
other grounds, para 27. 
 In Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby [2000] … Rimer J considered that he was piercing the 
veil. But I do not think that he was, para 31. 
 The same confusion of concepts is apparent in Sir Andrew Morritt V-C’s analysis 
in Trust AB v Smallbone (No 2) [2002] … As I read the V-C’s reason for giving 
judgment against Mr S. he did so on the concealment principle … This conclusion 
did not involve piercing the veil, and did not depend on any finding of 
impropriety, para 32. 
 In Gilford Motor and Lipman the ddts had a liability which arose independently of 
the company while in Trustor and Gencor where the evasion pple was not 
engaged, neither ddt used the company’s separate legal personality to evade a 
liability which they would otherwise have had as in Gilford Motor and Lipman, 
para 33. 
 It is clear from VTB Capital that the veil will not be pierced to create a new 
liability that would not otherwise exist, para 34. 
 I conclude that there is a limited principle of English law which applies where a 
person is under … The court may then pierce the veil for the purpose and only for 
the purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the advantage that they 
would otherwise have obtained by the co’s separate legal pers. I therefore disagree 
with the CA in VTB Capital who suggested that it may be appropriate to pierce the 
veil even if it is not necessary to do so. para 35. 
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 In the present case, the husband has acted improperly in many cases, but in doing 
so, he was neither concealing nor evading any legal obligation owed to his wife, 
para 36. (To add that this means that under the new test the veil will not be pierced 
if there was no concealment or evasion.) 
 If there is no justification as a matter of general legal principle for piercing the 
corporate veil, I find it impossible to say that a special and wider principle applies 
in matrimonial proceedings by virtue of section 24(1)(a) MCA 1973, para 37. 
 It follows that the only basis on which the companies can be ordered to convey the 
seven disputed properties to the wife is that they belong beneficially to the 
husband, para 43, 84. 
 The basis for finding that the matrimonial home was held on trust for the husband 
is that the six properties including the matrimonial home were acquired by PRL 
before it began operations and began to generate funds of its own, para. 48. 
 Although there is no general guidance, it is suggested that an asset say a mat home 
that is legally vested in a company may be considered to be beneficially owned by 
its controller, if the spouse owned and controlled the company then the home may 
be regarded as having been held on trust for him, para 52.  
 
Lord Neuberger 
 Cases concerned with concealment do not involve piercing the corporate veil, 
paras 61, 70. 
 I agree with Munby J in Ben Hashem [2009] that if the court has power to pierce 
the veil it could only do so when all other, more conventional, remedies have 
proved to be of no assistance (and therefore I disagree with the CA in VTB [2012] 
who suggested otherwise), para 62. 
 … but the application of the doctrine, even if it exists, in these cases is unsound, 
as Munby J effectively indicated in A v A [2007] and Ben Hashem [2009] para 
68(ii). 
 It is also clear from the cases and academic articles that the law relating to the 
doctrine is unsatisfactory and confused. These suggest to me that there is not a 
single instance in this jurisdiction where the doctrine has been invoked properly 
and successfully, para 64, 79. 
 The decision in Gilford Motor was not based on piercing the corporate veil, par 
71. 
  Also Jones. Invoking the doctrine there was not really necessary, para 73. 
 I agree with Lord Sumption that  the doctrine should only ne invoked where a 
person is under an existing legal obligation … which he deliberately evades or 
whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his 
control, para 81. 
 
Lady Hale  
 I am not sure whether it is possible to classify all of the cases … neatly into cases 
of either concealment or evasion, para 92. 
 Distinguishes between making someone liable for the company’s liability and 
making the company liable for someone’s liability, para 92. That the latter can 
only be done if the company was merely holding the property on trust for the 
person as here in Prest, para 93. 
 
Lord Mance 
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Piercing the veil situations are likely to be very rare, para 100. 
 
 
Lord Walker 
 I consider that piercing the corporate veil is not a doctrine at all, in the sense of a 
coherent principle or rule of law. It is simply a label, often used indiscriminately 
to describe … para 106. 
 
 
Extending the Rule in Family Cases 
The rule is more readily extended by judges in the Family Division where the court is 
prepared to lift the veil and cause property vested in a one-man company, which is the 
alter ego of the husband, to be transferred to the wife. 
 Nicholas v Nicholas [1984], par 23. 
 Green v Green [1993] 
 Mubarak v Mubarak [2001] Bodey J held that for the purpose of claims to 
ancillary financial relief the Family Division would lift the corporate veil not only 
where the company was a sham but ‘when it is just and necessary’. 
 Kremen v Agrest (No 2) [2011] Mostyn J held there was a ‘strong practical reason 
why the cloak should be penetrable even absent a finding of wrongdoing’, para 
23. 
 
But Munby J warned against departing from the fundamental legal principle in 
 A v A [2007] and in 
 Ben Hashem v Al Shayif [2009] where the differences in approach between the 
Family Div and the Chancery Div was acute. Here he formulated 6 principles to 
be derived from family and non-family cases. The pples limit the instances of 
piercing the veil, thus upholding the rule in Salomon, (par 25).  
 
 
 
 
 
Concealment Cases 
 Gilford Motors – injunction granted against Mr Horne on this pple (par 29, 70). 
 Jones v Lipman – specific performance decree on the concealment principle as 
against Mr Lipman 
 
 
 
 
Evasion Principle 
 Gilford Motors 
 Jones v Lipman – decision against the company justified on the evasion principle. 
 
 
 
VTB plc v Nutritek [2013] UKSC 
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 A lack of consensus in the judiciary on what the principle means paras 123-124, 
128. 
 Did the principle really exist? Para 124, exists in Adams v Cape - 127. 
 Decision in Gilford Motors not based on piercing the corporate veil, a point made 
by Toulson J in Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v R.I. [1998] 1 WLR 294  at 308, para 
134. See also Jason Neyers U. Toronto L.J. [2000] p. 220. 
 The same point applies to Jones v Lipman, para 135. 
 Para. 136 - see Gencor and Trustor cases re piercing the veil to impose liability on 
the company for the controller’s liability as Mrs Prest sought in Prest v Petrodel. 
But in Prest this was achieved via a different route. Also see Lady Hale’s 
distinction in para 92. 
 In my view, abuse of the corporate structure (is not a ground for lifting the veil), 
para 143. (To add that this means that the veil should not have been lifted in the 
sham or façade cases. See Marc  Moore below, p. 181, who argues that the 
practical ways in which the English courts have rationalised the Salomon 
exceptions is both wrong and doctrinally unsustainable. To add that perhaps the 
UKSC decision in Prest proves this). 
 It follows from this analysis that I doubt that the decision in Gramsci can be 
justified, at least on the basis of piercing the corporate veil. In agreement with the 
CA, I think that the reasoning in that case involved a misinter. of the basis of the 
decisions in Gilford and Jones, para 147. 
 
 
Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Recoletos Ltd [19-June-
2013] EWCA 
 
 In the present state of English law (following UKSC in Prest), the court could 
only pierce the veil when a person was under an existing legal obligation or 
liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evaded or 
whose enforcement he deliberately frustrated by interposing a company under his 
control, paras 64-65.  
 The veil will not necessarily be lifted only because the controller owns and 
controls the company which he formed for a fraudulent purpose. This is a legal 
question and the answer to it is a finding of at least mixed law and fact, if not one 
of pure law, para 45.  
 The references in Lord Sumption’s judgment in Prest [27] and [34] to “abuse of 
corporate personality” as justifying piercing the veil may appear to give some 
support to a policy-based approach. But it is clear from the decision that in the 
present state of English law, the court can only pierce the veil when … para 65. 
(To add that after analysing past cases including Gilford and Jones, Lord Smption 
[34] deduced that the cases “reflect the broader principle that the corporate veil 
may be pierced only to prevent the abuse of corporate personality.” But to argue 
that as stated by Beatson LJ above in Gramsci, although this may look like Lord 
Sumption is favouring a broad approach allowing the court to pierce the veil 
wherever there is abuse of corporate legal personality, his decision significantly 
narrows when the veil may be pierced. 
 In Prest, Lord Neuberger was of the view that there is a “lack of any coherent 
principle in the application of the doctrine of piercing the veil”, [75] and Lord 
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Walker’s view [at 106] was that it is not a doctrine in the sense of a coherent pple 
or rule of law but a label, para 66. 
 
 
Adams v Cape Ind. [1990] Ch. 
 
 Here, the CA refused to lift the corporate veil so as to expose the identity of the 
ddt as the controlling mind behind a complex arrangement through which 
potentially harmful asbestos products were marketed overseas. Slade LJ stressed 
that a member of a corporate group was entitled to use the corporate structure in 
such a way, (Moore, p. 182). 
 Soundly condemned the idea of lifting the veil in the interest of justice. 
 Slade LJ identified two grounds for piercing the veil, ie sham/façade – the most 
common and agency – only succeeded in Smith, Stone & Knight, (Moore, p. 183.) 
 Save in cases which turn upon the wording of particular statutes or contracts, the 
court is not free, to disregard the principle of Salomon v A. Salomon merely 
because it considers that justice so requires, para 536. 
 Neither in this class of case (i.e. groups of companies) nor in any other class of 
case is it open to this court to disregard the principles of Salomon merely because 
it considers it just to do so, para 537. (To add that although In re a Company 
[1985] was not referred to, this is a rejection of Cumming-Bruce LJ’s assertion 
therein referring to Wallersteiner v Moir that “in our view the cases before and 
after W v M show that the court will use its powers to pierce the corp veil if it is 
necessary to achieve justice irrespective of the legal efficacy of the corporate 
structure under consideration”, from Cheng, p. 354). 
 From the authorities cited to us we are left with rather sparse guidance as to the 
principles which should guide the court in determining whether or not the 
arrangements of a corporate group involve a façade within the meaning of the 
words used by the HL in Woolfson, para 543 (to reinforce re lack of coherent 
principle).   
 
 
Ben Hashem v Ali Shayif [2008] 
 Piercing the corp. veil was appropriate only where special circ indicated that it 
was a mere façade, Woolfson v SRC. 
 Control of a co was not of itself enough to justify piercing, Salomon. Nor could 
piercing occur merely b/c it was thought necessary in the interest of justice. There 
had to be impropriety, Ord v Belhaven Pubs. And the impropriety had to be linked 
to the corp structure, Trustor AB v Smallbone [2001] 
 
 
Mubarak v Mubarak [2000] 
 Distinguishes b/w and deals with VP in two strands of authorities, that those 
decided in the company/commercial law sphere and those decided in the family 
law sphere and  
 Reviews VP in family law cases and concludes that the precise extent of the 
Family Division’s power to go directly against the property of a company owned 
or controlled by one of the spouses appears less than clear. 
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 The above conclusion derives from parallel CA decisions, ie Crittenden v 
Crittenden [1990] 2 FLR 361 and Wicks v Wicks [1998] 1 FLR 470 where the CA 
disowned the power, in the Wicks case power to sell land belonging to a company 
in which H had shares. These two CA decisions made no reference to Nicholas v 
Nicholas [1984] FLR 285 where held the power exists when the circumstances 
there specified pertain. Here CA held the veil could not be pierced regarding a 
company’s ownership of the matrimonial home because minority interests in the 
company were owned by the husband’s business associates. Dillon LJ said “if the 
company was a one-man company and the alter ego of H, I would have no 
difficulty in holding that there was power to order a transfer of the property, but 
that is not this case.” 
 Besides, company law does not recognise any exception to the separate entity 
principle based simply on a spouse’s having sole ownership and control. 
 Boden J noted that the company approach is different from the family approach 
and advocated for a rationalisation i.e. an adoption of a common approach by the 
Family Division and the Chancery Division. 
 Boden J suggested that the FD can make orders directly or indirectly regarding a 
company’s assets where (a) H is the owner and controller of the company 
concerned and (b) where there are no adverse third parties whose position or 
interests would be likely to be prejudiced by such an order being made, p. 7. 
 I would add that lifting the veil is most likely to be acceptable where the asset 
concerned (being the property of an effective one-man company) is the parties 
former matrimonial home, or other such property owned by the company other 
than for day-to-day trading purposes, p. 8. 
 As counsel has said, there does not seem to be any decided case in which the 
authorities in the  family sphere have been considered in the company sphere nor 
do the authoritative textbooks of Palmer and Gore-Browne mention those family 
cases where lifting the veil has been discussed. 
 
 
 
 
Articles 
Thomas Cheng “The Corp Veil Doctrine: A Comparative Study 
…” 
 A perennial challenge facing the corporate veil doctrine has been attempt to 
increase its predictability … pp 330-1 – from Marc Moore @ fn2, below, p. (to 
add that it is perhaps the open-endedness and unpredictable nature of the doctrine 
that has attracted much of the criticisms levied against it). 
 The attitude of the English courts towards the veil doctrine has been a 
rollercoaster one oscillating form enthusiasm to outright hostility at times, p. 334. 
(This has culminated in the near demise of the doctrine by the UKSC in Prest.) 
Cheng divides the history of the rule into 3 periods (ibid). 
 Until the late 1970s English courts demonstrated considerable willingness to 
pierce the veil when justice so required, p. 331 (to add that but the UKSC has now 
stated that those cases were not really veil piercing cases and the decisions could 
have been reached on different basis – under possible sub-heading ‘veil –piercing 
rule reformulated?’) 
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 Lord Denning took the lead in veil piercing and in DHN Food Distributors Ltd v 
TH LBC [1976] called for judicial flexibility towards corporate personality, a 
position described as commendable by Cheng, p. 338. 
 In the D.H.N. case, Lord Denning took a single economic unit theory approach 
declaring that the group of companies was virtually the same as a partnership, p. 
339, 388 et seq. 
 Single Economic Unit argument rejected by the CA in Bank of Tokyo v Karoon 
[1987] A.C. 45, saying “we are concerned not with economics but with law. The 
distinction b/w the two is, in law, fundamental and cannot here be abridged”, p. 
340. 
 Veil piercing finally weakened in Adams v Cape where CA declared that the use 
of the corporate structure to limit future liabilities is an inherent future of English 
company law and practically ruled out veil piercing in tort cases, p. 340. (To 
discuss the history of veil piercing under possible sub-heading “The Veil-piercing 
Trajectory from Salomon to Prest: A Brief Survey” – see pp 334-342 and Moore) 
 But HL pierced veil recently in Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore [2009] p. 394.  
 In the earlier non-veil piercing case of Lee v Sheard [1956] 1 QB compared the r/s 
b/w a shareholder and his company to a partnership, p. 339.  
 The paradigmatic corporate veil case is one in which the separate corp pers is 
disregarded and the shareholders are held liable for the co’s debts. … Such cases 
may be called shareholder liability cases because veil piercing results in 
shareholder liability for corporate debts, p. 343 (to add that as below, these are 
forward piercing cases unlike Prest where the claimant sought to make the co 
responsible for the shareholder’s liabilities). 
 (sub-head – ‘The primacy of Justice in Corp Veil cases’ see Slade LJ’s in Adams v 
Cape and Cumming-Bruce LJ’s in In re a Company above and at pp. 354) 
 Pp. 366-7, (to argue here that the China O S v Mitrans [1995 and the In re Darby, 
Brougham [1911] p. 358- cases show that the evasion and concealment 
categorisation predate Prest.) 
 The time of incorporation of the subsidiary, argues that it should precede the 
incurrence of the legal obligation as in Yukong v RIC, pp. 367-9. 
 In Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] (primarily concerned with 
attribution of shareholder intentions to the company) the HL pierced the veil 
between a co and its sole beneficial shareholder to impute his fraudulent intentions 
to the company, p. 394. To analyse re Lady Hale’s distinction in Prest. 
 Interestingly, Stone & Rolls is not a case of forward veil piercing – the imposition 
of shareholder responsibility for corporate liabilities – which is the usual type of 
veil piercing. It instead involved reverse veil piercing. The company was deemed 
responsible for its shareholder’s conduct. Reverse piercing is usually considered 
more controversial than forward piercing because the company’s stakeholders – 
must share the company’s assets with the shareholder’s creditors. Given that in 
most cases, a company has more stakeholders than an individual has creditors, 
reverse piercing affects more innocent parties and raises more fairness issues than 
forward piercing, pp 395-6 & 372, 386, 393-. (To analyse forward and reverse 
piercing re Lady Hale’s distinction in Prest under possible sub-head ‘the forward 
and reverse piercing distinction’). Stone & Rolls [2009] reverse piercing p. 395. 
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Marc Moore: “A Temple Built on Faulty Foundations: Piercing 
the Corp Veil…” [2006] JBL  
 
 While the Salomon case was a small private company… the basic principle 
therein was extended by the CA in 1991 (Adams v Cape?) to cover the more 
complex scenario of a MNC operating abroad through its subsidiaries, p. 180. 
 The general reasoning of the courts regarding the exceptions to Salomon (e..g. the 
agency exception as in Smith, Stone & Knight, single economic unit as in DHN 
Food Dist v TH, etc) is confusing and at times contradictory, p. 183. 
 Argues that Slade LJ’s insistence on the exclusivity of ‘sham’ as the only basis for 
piercing the veil in Adams v Cape maintains the integrity and autonomy of the 
corporate form in Salomon and prevents it from abuse at the same time, pp. 184. 
 Reviews old cases and argues therefrom that sham was a recognisable exception 
to Salomon even though Salomon was barely mentioned in these cases, The non 
reference to Salomon in these 4 cases suggests that sham developed independently 
of Salomon, pp 191 fn 40. 
 Argues from Ord v Belhaven Pubs that the motivation of ltd liability to form a co 
should not be a ground for lifting the veil, as this was recognised in Salomon, pp 
199 et seq, fn 62… 
 
 
Jason Neyers: “Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing and the 
Private Law Model Corporation” (2000) 50 U. Toronto L.J. 173 
 
 The Salomon principle is seen as the central and foundational pple of corporate 
law and is rarely questioned. As Lord Templeman claims (in ‘Forty Years on 
(1990) 11 Co. Law 10) it is the ‘unyielding rock’ on which corporate law is 
constructed, p. 179. (To add that the UKSC decision in Prest upheld Salomon by 
restricted circumstances under which the veil might be pierced). 
 The separate entity pple is directly contradicted by other common law … pp. 179-
183 et seq (To argue that the piercing the veil exceptions are not a contradiction of 
the pple. Every rule has its exceptions and the exceptions cannot be seen as a 
contradiction of the rule. Piercing the veil upholds the integrity of Salomon by 
preventing abuse of the principle.) 
 Argues that the agency exception really does not violate corp pers, pp. 181 et seq. 
See also Marc Moore supra, p. 183. 
 Gilford really has nothing to do with either narrow veil-piercing or violations of 
limited liability, p. 220. See also VTB v Nutritek above. 
 
 
 
Peter Oh, “Veil-Piercing Unbound” 93 B.U.L. Rev 89, 2013 
(quote Stephen Bainbridge at note 12: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236967) 
 
 But from its inception, veil-piercing has been an abysmal failure. There is no 
uniform test for veil-piercing, which typically requires demonstrating that a 
corporation was an ‘alter ego’ or ‘instrumentality’ controlled or dominated by a 
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shareholder to perpetuate a fraud, wrong, or injustice that proximately caused loss 
or injury to a plaintiff, p. 90. 
 Veil-piercing (VP) is misapplied because it is misconceived. For about a century 
VP has been regarded as an exception to, and thus inextricably linked with the 
predicate pple of limited liability. Hence, what one makes of veil-piercing 
depends on the first instance on one’s view of ltd liability. Pursuant to this view 
VP is justified potentially only when ltd liability is not. [This stems from ltd 
liability being framed as loss-allocation …] p. 91. (To analyse under possible sub-
heading “Dissecting The Ltd Liability and VP R/s”. see P. Bailey, p. 4 ) 
 Argues that once the appropriate limits of ltd liability are understood, VP can 
police those limits, pp. 99. 
 Pure VP enables a pff to reach the personal assets of only a shareholder, p. 102. 
(To use re forward and reverse VP). 
 As a result ltd liability has spawned a group of cases that look and stumble like 
VP but in fact are not. (pp. 102-3). 
 This mutation belies how ltd liability and VP are misaligned. The rationales for 
ltd liability justify its preservation within a broad range of scenarios. But that 
justification does not quadrate perfectly with the scope of VP qua unlimited 
liability, p. 103. 
 According to Hansmann and Kraakman, “to decide that there are any 
circumstances in which shareholders can be held liable for tort damages … is to 
discard ltd liability in pple” pp. 109-110 (although reference here is made to tort 
only, to buttress my argument that by restricting the operation of the VP rule to 
only when … the UKSC upheld ltd liability in Prest.) 
 Originally conceived as a provisional remedy, piercing was available incidentally 
and only when no relief could be had from a corporation, p. 113. 
 Examines alternative methods of achieving justice in the US context such as 
constructive trust, p. 123. 
 
 
Case Comment, Co. L. Newsletter 2013; “Supreme Court 
Refuses to Extend Piercing the Veil of Incorporation” 
 
 Comments on UKSC and lower courts’ decisions in VTB Capital v Nutritek. 
Existence of Principle Questioned 
 CA rejected the submission that there is no such principle as piercing the veil and 
approvingly cited Lord Keith’s speech in Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional 
Council [1978] that “it is appropriate to pierce the veil only where special 
circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts.” 
 CA commented that it was not open to it to question the existence of the VP pple. 
 CA rejected piercing the veil on a contract claim that was not recognisable in 
English law. That it was appropriate to pierce the veil only where special 
circumstances existed indicating that it was a mere façade concealing the true 
facts. 
 Cites Ottolenghi “From Peeping behind the Corporate … (1990) 53 MLR 338. 
 The UKSC was prepared to assume in VTB that the power to piece the veil on 
appropriate facts existed, starting with Salomon which is seen as representing an 
early, though failed, attempt to pierce the veil. 
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 Lord Neuberger in the UKSC agreed that there is no principled basis upon which 
it can be said that one can pierce the veil from the fact that “the precise nature, 
basis and meaning of the pple are all somewhat obscure, as are the precise nature 
of circumstances iin which the pple can apply”. 
 He warned that words such as façade, sham, etc may be useful metaphors, but that 
“such pejorative …. 
 He believed that not all the veil piercing cases can be explained as inconsistent 
with pple and unnecessary to achieve justice. 
 According to Lord Neuberger abuse of rights, ie the corp structure is not a 
separate ground for piercing the veil. It may have been another way of describing 
use of the company as a façade to conceal the true facts or an additional 
requirement before the veil will be pierced, but it would be an illegitimate 
extension of the circumstances in which the veil can be pierced. 
 Although Lord Neuberger pointed to piercing the veil in certain circumstances “in 
order to defeat injustice”, this is not an expansion of the pple and the façade 
requirement remained the test. 
 
 
Peter Bailey, “Lifting the Veil becomes a Remedy of …” Co. L. Newsletter, 2013. 
 
 The ltd liability and VP r/s from Lord Sumption’s speech. 
 Lord Sumption felt that the terms façade and sham which were rather vague 
reflect two distinct pples, ie concealment and evasion. 
 That the concealment pple did not involve piercing the veil at all. 
 The UKSC held that the court’s power to pierce the veil could only be exercised 
“when all other, more conventional, remedies have proved to be of no assistance” 
 
 
Easterbrook & Fischel; “Limited Liability and the Corporation” 
[1985] 52 Chi. L.Rev. 89 
 
 Limited liability is a fundamental pple of corporate law. Yet liability has never 
been absolutely limited. Courts occasionally allow creditors to “pierce the 
corporate veil,” which means that shareholders must satisfy creditors’ claims. 
‘Piercing’ seems to happen freakishly. Like lightening, it is rare, severe and 
unprincipled. There is consensus that the whole area of limited liability, and 
conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most confusing in 
corporate law, (To use re Ltd liability and VP r/s). p. 89. 
 Discusses academic explanations for limited liability, pp 90-97.  
 VP cases may be understood, at least roughly, as attempts to balance the benefits 
of limited liability against its costs, p. 109 
 
 
 
 
